"... you write, as you seem to know E5 better than I, an analyse (in an academic way!) of the propositions of E5 connected with the mind's highest good. Then we could discuss your analyse of these propositions and read those which, in the whole Ethics, seem necessary to the understanding of them."
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[initial text deleted] While I had hoped with my original post to find someone who could explain these things to me and to others I will do what I can to fulfill your suggestion. I'm not clear on what constitutes "an academic way", being a non-academic so forgive me this attempt and please correct and educate me as you see the need. Of course the entire Ethics must be studied from beginning to end. I can only assume that many who participate in this list have already done so. The list archive shows slow reading having taken place from the beginning of E1 as it should have and since no one has replied with information about where things left off I can only assume that there are no objections to the present inquiry. That said I would like to look at several propositions in the fifth part, related to the third kind of knowledge, by starting from a common footing, proceeding forward, then looking at the other support for those specific propositions. The propositions under study will be E5P25 through E5P31, which I will first list without their proofs. In what then follows I will comment and include the text of the propositions/proofs where it seems necessary and references to other key text. These of course must be well understood and will require further study.
[The Propositions:]
E5P25. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to
understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
E5P26. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by
the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that
kind.
E5P27. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental
acquiescence.
E5P28. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge
cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.
E5P29. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does
not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the
body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of
eternity.
E5P30. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of
eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that
it is in God, and is conceived through God.
E5P31. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause,
in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
[POINT 1: Kinds of Knowledge] I will begin by looking at Spinoza's definitions of the three kinds of knowledge since a key feature of the propositions to be covered is the distinction between the second and third kinds. ========= From E2P40N2: 1. "Knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience or from symbols (e.g. words)." He calls both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
2. "From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas
of the properties of things."
This he calls reason and knowledge of the
second kind.
3. "Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter
show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of
knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain
attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."
The primary point to keep in mind is that up until the mid-portion of E5
Spinoza is involved for the most part in forming the second kind of
knowledge with regard to God, the human mind and the emotions and keeping
the mind from confusing this with the first kind of knowledge. The second
kind involves reasoning or inferring things from the common notions (not to
be confused with "general" notions representing common parts of confused
images [E2P40N1] such as "man", "dog", etc.) and is adequate knowledge
[E2P39]. These common notions "do not answer to the essence of any
particular thing" [E2P44C2] while we will find that the third kind of
knowledge does involve "particular things" such as your particular mind.
The following proposition will figure in the proof of two propositions
(E5P25 and P27) we're reaching toward so let's look at it.
Keep in mind that the proof of this is based on reasoning from common
notions and that also this highest good is available to all [E4P36].
However, does the knowledge of, and striving for, the mind's highest good
help us to attain the ordinary things of life that we think of as the
highest good? Such things as more money, more fame or recognition, more or
better sensual pleasure. I know of no one who would refuse such things,
myself included, unless they have begun to see that there might be something
of greater value towards which to direct our efforts. Spinoza mentions this
at the beginning of the TEI but if we have not begun to sense this for
ourselves then this topic may appear to be part of some abstract
intellectual game and have no actual importance beyond that.
========= E5P24:
Proof.--This is evident from E1P25C.
Reference:
========= E1P25C:
The proof appears from E1P15 [Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God
nothing can be, or be conceived.] and E1D5 [By mode, I mean the
modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived
through, something other than itself].
Notice that he is now talking about understanding "particular things",
not common notions which do not express any particular thing. I believe this
is an important point that I had been missing at first. When we know the
particular thing which is our own mind and body, to whatever degree, it
stands out much more clearly than when we know the nature of the human mind
in general by reasoning from common notions. Also I believe the things we
know by common notions are more readily, at the same time, imagined and
thereby confused with other things. My sense is that knowing particular
things directly involve such certainty that they are not as easily confused
with imaginings.
========= E5P25:
Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of
certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things
(see its definition E2P40N2); and, in proportion as we understand things
more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop. E5P24);
therefore (E4P28) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (E4D8 [see below])
the power, or nature, or (E3P7 [see below]) highest endeavour of the mind,
is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.
References:
========= E3P7:
Here we join the notion of the highest good and virtue with that direct,
non-inferential knowledge of the third kind. Since our own particular mind,
by its very essence as a mode of God in the attribute of thought, endeavours
to persist in that being --the endeavour is greater through the activity of
direct knowledge than through indirect knowledge by inference from common
notions. From this the next proposition follows:
========= E5P26:
Proof.--This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be
capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent,
conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of
the Emotions, E3DOE1), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is
more capable thereof. Q.E.D.
In the past I imagined the mind either knows or does not "know God" and
that of course if one ever did come to "know God" it would be like all those
stories of "heaven" with angels winging and trumpets blaring and life would
be grand from then on. But notice here and elsewhere Spinoza indicates "in
proportion" as the mind is more capable of understanding. And he also
indicates that sometimes the mind is less capable such as when we experience
a strong negative emotion. The "God" in our imagination and God as substance
of infinite attributes are "as far apart as the poles" but our imagination
tries to present what it can and track our understanding while knowledge of
the third kind cannot be imagined.
My own "experiences" started as mere flashes of insight followed by
much confusion but once they became longer and more focused and reflective
of the ideas presented in the Ethics my desire for more increased. Of
course, I cannot prove to anyone else that I have attained to any degree
what Spinoza refers to as knowledge of the third kind, but my own certainty
in this remains and I am not deterred in my endeavour by the lack of
supporting evidence from others. Still, "in proportion as the mind is more
capable", etc. does not say that once some capability however small is
attained it is readily available at the flick of a mental switch and will
automatically grow from there. "All things excellent are as difficult..."
etc.
========= E5P27:
Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (E4P28), or to
understand things by the third kind of knowledge (E5P25), and this virtue is
greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of
knowledge (E5P24): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of
knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
of the Emotions, E3DOE2) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure
being accompanied [E2P43] by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus
(Def. of the Emotions, E3DOE25), from this kind of knowledge arises the
highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.
References:
========= E3DOE2:
========= E3DOE25:
Again, when Spinoza says "passes to the summit of human perfection" I do
not believe he means this as some upper limit actually attained but rather
"in proportion as the mind is more capable". He does mention for instance in
the TPT his belief about Christ as follows:
========= TPT01-P21:
Keep in mind of course his complete separation of Philosophy from
Theology so don't let the reference to Christ sway you, any more than his
use of the term God, into confusing the two.
And in his own case, in answer to Blyenbergh:
========= Let-34:
By indicating he ascends "from time to time a step higher" while also
saying "this knowledge gives me the highest contentment" I believe it is
clear that in the current proposition "highest pleasure" is not an actual
limit. Also notice that Spinoza lived his life in time like the rest of us
while his body endured and must have suffered pain from his illness so the
perfection was along side an otherwise normal life!
Since pleasure is "the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection", when we know our own particular mind through this third kind of
knowledge our own mind's perfection is increased in proportion and therefore
in proportion we experience pleasure. Again, I can only speak about my own
brief experiences but this type of pleasure, to whatever degree, is of a
"quality" quite different from the "rush" of winning the lottery, receiving
awards or adulation, or attaining orgasm, etc. These each leave one able to
think of little else while the third kind of knowledge opens us to knowing
more and greater things!
========= E5P28:
Proof. This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understand
clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that
which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and
distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge E2P40N2
cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred
to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or
ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the
Emotions, E3DOE1), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of
knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D
Notice that this is not saying that the third kind of knowledge is
formed from the second kind of knowledge by reasoning or inference. The
third kind of knowledge is still direct knowledge the mind forms as a
thinking thing. When he says "follow from adequate ideas" I believe he means
this in the way that for instance by studying Euclid's Elements Book7, Prop.
19 we may have a clear and distinct idea of some particular proportional but
that from seeing this (or even without it) we may then become aware of it
also directly by an intuitive grasp [E2P40N2].
========= E5P29:
Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body,
it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to
that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time
(E5P21 and E2P26). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration
(E1D8). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving
things under the form of eternity, But it possesses such power, because it
is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity
(E2P44C2), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the
essence of the body under the form of eternity (E5P23), for besides these
two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (E2P13). Therefore
this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to
the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under
the form of eternity. Q.E.D
Note. Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing
in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following
from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this
second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and
their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in
E2P45 and E2P45N, which see.
========= E5P30:
Proof.-- Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves
necessary existence (E1D8). Therefore to conceive things under the form of
eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the
essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence
through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent
necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, etc. Q.E.D.
When we conceive ourselves as existing in relation to a given time and
place, that is, during this period in the history of a particular group of
people on this particular planet, etc. our life has a beginning, a middle,
and an end.
But in so far as the mind conceives itself (and the body) as contained
in God and following from the necessity of God's nature it conceives itself
as an expression of that very eternal, necessary existence of God. To this
extent it knows itself without relation to time.
As I mentioned before, this is not an either/or situation. Our mind/body
is very complex and time and Eternity (if we come to know it), I believe are
both "experienced" together.
Proof. The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity,
except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity
(E5P29); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (E5P21 and E5P23);
therefore (by the last Prop. E5P30), in so far as it is eternal, it
possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate
(E2P46); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing
everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (E2P40), in
other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge E2P40N2,
whereof accordingly the mind (E3D1), in so far as it is eternal, is the
adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.
Here, I must confess, the proof of this last proposition puts my
thoughts once again into the realm of pleasant fantasy. Although, as I've
mentioned, the "experiences" I've been having which I described in a
previous post in part as:
"... by 'moments' in Eternity I'm trying to express the idea of time and
timelessness in one experience while the timelessness seems 'above and
outside' of time." and "... At the peak of these experiences there is a
profound sense of Eternity and the Infinite and Spinoza's ideas seem to come
alive for me"
The following idea expressed in the proof of E5P31 has not become clear to
my mind:
========
This sounds much like his comment on the chief good in the TEI:
========
I do not know whether any of this is helpful to others and I hope it
will at least provoke discussion. I know others have studied this section of
the Ethics and must have greater insights than I have. If we each express
our thoughts here we may help each other see a different point of view. Ok,
I say an elephant is like a telephone pole! --(Just pulling his leg :-)
I believe writing this is a good exercise for me but I must admit that
getting the thoughts that flow during the brief "experiences" turned into
words seems impossible and trying to write about them from memory seems even
more so. I cannot top Spinoza's own words which remain my primary source of
study.
It is as though, having been a tadpole all my life, I'm beginning to
sense my amphibious [literally: living a double life] nature. I still know
most about the life of swimming and breathing water and all my ordinary
experiences are there. But I tell you there's air, and light, and sky
somewhere beyond these murky depths! But just now it's only a memory.
Unlike the amphibious creatures that will grow automatically into air
breathers we apparently require great effort and the proper direction to
lift ourselves out of time and into Eternity.
Terry
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