Hi All,

    In studying Spinoza's works it becomes apparent, even if only by reading his words, that he distinguishes between two fundamentally different ways in which our mind may know anything, and he refers to these by the terms Imagination and Understanding (or Intellect.) This may seem simple enough and most of us probably assume that we know and can readily distinguish the difference between these, at least in our own minds. If I learn how to use arithmetic for instance I may say that balancing my checkbook is an act involving my understanding, while learning to paint or to draw pictures or to produce other such works might involve more of imagination than understanding, even if it also involves some of that too. It's not like we've never heard the words Understanding and Imagination before, and so, most of us probably just think of whatever our own experience and memory brings to mind when Spinoza uses these terms, and we just add his particular words and phrases to our existing collection wherever they happen to fall by previous associations.

    It seems though that Spinoza must think that Understanding is much more difficult to distinguish from Imagination than we might at first believe, since he wrote a whole treatise on the subject ("The Improvement of the Understanding" or, "...of the Intellect") which purports to help us distinguish between these two. He also devotes considerable attention to this distinction in his other works. For instance, in the Ethics, Part 2, he makes a point of showing that:

====== E2: PROP. 41:
Knowledge of the first kind [he names this Imagination, which includes hearsay and ordinary sense experience] is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second [Reason] and third [Intuition] kinds is necessarily true.

Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note E2P40N2) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (E2P35). Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (E2P34). Q.E.D.
======

    And, in "The Improvement of the Understanding", he made the comment that most of our practical knowledge in life involves only the above named Imagination:

====== TEI-P20(18):
...By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other matters about which I have never felt any doubt. By mere experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for the same period, or die by the same disease. I know by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and water of extinguishing it. In the same way I know that a dog is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all the practical knowledge of life.
======

    Apparently just reading or hearing words, which Spinoza shows belong to the Imagination, and being able to repeat them back under particular conditions (such as when taking an exam in school or when doing our job, etc.) does not constitute Understanding for Spinoza. This would seem especially to be the case since he also wrote in the Ethics that:

====== E2: PROP. 44, Corollary 2:
--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis specie).

Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (E2P44). Reason perceives this necessity of things (E2P41) truly--that is (E1A6), as it is in itself. But (E1P16) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (E2P38), which answer to things common to all, and which (E2P37) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.
======

    Just ask yourself how often, when you say to someone (or just think to yourself) things like; "I understand how that works.", or; "Yes, I know what it means that a body is in motion or at rest.", etc., are you aware at the same time of the Eternal Nature of God, and of those "things common to all" (which are also Eternal), which must follow necessarily from that same Nature, and which must be involved in Understanding as Spinoza defines and explains it? Are you always aware? sometimes aware? or, do you just not know whether you are aware or not? Perhaps, of course, if you have studied Spinoza before, you will simply say something like; "Well, of course I must be aware of this because Spinoza proved it in E2P44, Corollary 2.", but is that what Spinoza means by Understanding or perceiving things under the form of Eternity? We can perhaps memorize and repeat back all of Spinoza's words, but that is not what he defines and explains as Understanding.

    Whatever it is that Spinoza means by Understanding it is apparently not so easily come by as we might imagine, and it seems that we are also prevented from improving our Understanding by the simple fact that we Imagine that we already understand so many things simply because we have learned to repeat back particular words, or to perform particular physical movements, etc., when other words or sense impressions are presented to us. Thus, we, and other people (who are doing the same thing), will agree with each other and acknowledge that we do indeed "understand."

    If we Understand things (in Spinoza's sense) directly (Intuitively), or if we Understand things because our mind has adequate ideas which follow from the adequate ideas of those things Spinoza refers to as "common to all" (i.e., by Reason), then our mind must at the same time know that these things follow from the Necessity of the Divine Nature. If we are not aware of this, then it is because our mind is more occupied with words and images than with Ideas, and so we readily mistake our own Imagination for Understanding, even if we do have brief moments of the latter.

    This is the problem faced by the folks who were brought up since birth in Plato's Cave. No matter what words are spoken in conjunction with whatever shadows may appear on the cave wall, nothing is "real" to them unless they hear words and/or see shadows (which they of course don't know to be only shadows.) If Spinoza comes into the cave, and, assuming that he is not allowed to make physical contact with those who are chained facing the wall, he begins to try to explain to them what their predicament actually is, and further tries to explain what life outside of the cave is like, what tools will he have to use beside his words and those shadows which they see before them on the wall? If he tries to explain "outside" or "sunlight", etc., the inhabitants will expect to see some particular shadow on the wall and so they might ask; "Do you mean by 'outside' the one on the left there next to the 'xxxxx'?" (use your own imagination here, they are referring to some arrangement of different shadows on the wall which is all that they see :-). How can Spinoza reply to them in a way which will help them to Understand what he means since they do not even know the nature of the shadows, but rather believe them to be the only "actual things" existing. Most of us cannot see this as an analogy but only focus on the absurdity of the story. Yet we ourselves are, by analogy, caught in a similar predicament by our own Imagination, which has formed automatically since birth, and it is not until it is well populated with our own particular shadows and word associations that we might come to wonder if there is anything more to "life" than this "world" of our imagination which we unknowingly mistake for reality.

    So, we have, for whatever reason, turned to Spinoza's writings and begun to read. Is it any wonder that so many of us find what seem to be errors in logic, or that his meaning escapes us, and that his words often make little or no sense but rather seem in places to be contradictory? Spinoza is trying to help us to discover something with which we have no experience, but most of us tend to take it the other way around. We believe that we already understand many things and so what we are looking for is some assurance and explanation that makes all of those things "more clear" to us. In other words, we want Spinoza to help make sense of the shadows on the wall of our own cave, while we completely miss the fact that he is starting from, and basing everything he writes about on, Substance, not shadows!

    Fortunately the situation is not totally hopeless, since Spinoza assures us (in "The Improvement") that it took him some time to realize many things which at first were only brief feelings for him, but as he proceeded he discovered that we all have within us, by our very nature, the tools we need to find our way and he has spent much time and effort in trying to carefully explain how we too can come to Understand things even as he has. He does warn us that this will be exceedingly difficult, and so, if we have some notion that by simply reading all of his words, and maybe imagining bodies in motion as we have already been doing all of our lives, or maybe simply naming the various emotions we experience according to his scheme, etc., we will thereby come to Understand as he does, then we will probably be disappointed and we may find much of what Spinoza has written seems like some abstract academic exercise, rather than a guidebook to our own Mind's Highest Blessedness which is Our Eternal Nature.

    Still, Spinoza does encourage us by such words as:

===== At the end of the Short Treatise:
...if, on reading this through, you should meet with some difficulty about what I state as certain, I beseech you that you should not therefore hasten at once to refute it, before you have pondered it long enough and thoughtfully enough, and if you do this I feel sure that you will attain to the enjoyment of the fruits of this tree which you promise yourselves.
=====

Hi All,

    Spinoza defines three Kinds of Knowledge in the Ethics:

======= E2: PROP. 40, Note 2:
--From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--

[1st Kind - Imagination:]

From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (E2P29C); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.

From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (E2P18N). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.

[2nd Kind - Reason:]

From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (E2P38C, E2P39, E2P39C, and E2P40); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind.

[3rd Kind - Intuition:]

Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things....
=======

    In the first sentence he describes the three kinds of knowledge which he is about to define as involving the perceiving and forming of our "general notions", and then, in his subsequent definition of Reason, he refers to "notions common to all men." Are the "notions" which we perceive or form through our Imagination the same as those which he refers to as "common to all men" and which latter form the basis of Reason? Perhaps, on our first few readings, we might see the word "notions" and assume that we know what he means and imagine that all "notions" are of basically the same nature, even if the Kinds of Knowledge he is defining seem to be different from each other. Using the analogy of Plato's Cave we might assume that all "notions", including "notions common to all men", refer to any words and shadows which we and most other people seem to agree upon (except maybe those few people who keep talking about 'outside' and 'sunlight', etc. but who never quite seem to make it clear which of the myriad shadows they are referring to!) However, the previous note (E2P40, Note 1) makes it clear that he recognizes several fundamentally different types of notions. He began that note with:

======= E2: PROP. 40, Note 1:
--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of, our ratiocination. [He is referring here to E2P37 through E2P40 as he will show in his following note (E2P40, Note 2 above) when he defines Reason --TNeff]

But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded....
=======

    He referred specifically to E2P13L2 as "notions common to all men" which form the bases of Reason. However, here in this note, he is going to talk about other notions which people form, and which differ from one person to another, and which belong, not to our Understanding, but to our Imagination, which he has already shown (E2P17 - E2P18) to involve the modifications of our own particular body as it is affected by (imagines), and retains the associations of impressions of (memory), particular external bodies, and which must differ from one individual to another. He will explain here that these other notions may be categorized into two types, which vary from one another only by the degrees of confusion. On the other hand, he has already shown that there can be no confusion involved in those notions which form the bases of Reason (E2P13L2):

======= E2: PROP. 40, Note 1 (continued --Transcendental notions):
...in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in E2P17CN) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another.

    This being so, it is evident (from E2P17C and E2P18) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, etc. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused....
=======

    Note that a "distinct image" is still not an adequate idea (see E2P19 thru E2P31C), such as is involved in those notions referred to in E2P13L2 (see E2P37 thru E2P40), and so even a "distinct image" of some particular bodies moving, which we each necessarily imagine differently, is not the bases of Reason to which Spinoza refers.

    He goes on to explain other notions, which differ from those he just described as; "in the highest degree confused", but these other notions are still confused products of our own particular Imagination:

======= E2: PROP. 40, Note 1 (continued --General notions):
...From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, etc. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, etc.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals.

    We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.

    It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.
=======

    Notice that Spinoza says of these general notions that they are formed in each individual; "according to the habit of his body" and so they must necessarily differ from one individual to another, unlike those "notions common to all men", which he shows form the bases of Reason (see E2P37 thru E2P40 along with E2P13L2), and, of which, each mind can only form adequate ideas which must also be the same in each mind.

    Everyone will imagine something when they read or hear the words; "extension" or "motion and rest" but these images are not the adequate ideas Spinoza refers to as the bases of Reason. Our task, if we desire to Improve our Understanding of the Ideas Spinoza has expressed, is to discover for ourselves, within our own Mind, the difference between the images of things and adequate ideas, or, in other words, between our Imagination and our Understanding. As he writes in The Improvement:

======= TEI-P84(64):
    Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious , false, and the rest, originate in the imagination--that is, in certain sensations fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body, sleeping or waking, receives various motions.

    But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and that the soul is passive with regard to it. The view taken is immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite, with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the understanding. Let no one then be astonished that before proving the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of imagination of body, and of its composition. The view taken is, I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite, etc....
=======

Hi All,

    I'd like to offer some further thoughts on something I posted recently [9/30/2008] in response to [another list member] regarding those things "common to all" which Spinoza refers to as the bases of Reason.

    I wrote:

Terry:
> The things common to all bodies which
> Spinoza refers in E2P37-P40 as
> being those in E2P13L2, are common
> to ALL bodies, human, cow,
> rock, paper, scissors, ..., gas, liquid,
> solid, plasma, even "energy"! (we
> might discuss that later) and perhaps the
> one easiest to think about is
> "motion and rest" itself as the Immediate
> Mode of Extension (which itself
> of course is also common to all bodies --E2P13L2)...

    When I said that perhaps it is easiest to think about "motion and rest" I only meant easier than thinking about the Attribute of Extension from which "motion and rest" follow immediately. And I mentioned in the material I had copied from an older post that...:

Terry:
> ...even a "distinct image" of some
> particular bodies moving, which we
> each necessarily imagine differently,
> is not the bases of Reason to
> which Spinoza refers....

    For example, if anyone is asked if they know what motion and rest are they will most likely say that of course they do and they will imagine some particular bodies moving or maybe reach out and move some object on a table to another location and say that this shows that they know what motion and rest are. But now ask yourself about the idea Spinoza expresses that "motion and rest" are immediate Modes of the Attribute of Extension. To have an adequate idea of this means that your mind must affirm the Attribute of Extension as prior to "motion and rest" since "motion and rest", being Modes, must be conceived, not through themselves, but through something else, namely the Attribute of Extension and Extension, being an Attribute of Substance must be conceived through itself.

    So, again, it seems easier to start with motion and rest, even if at first we only imagine particular bodies moving or if we reach out and move some actual body on the table (which we perceive by imagination through our senses.) However, as Spinoza writes in the following note, it is very difficult to conceive Extension (and from that then "motion and rest") rather than just imagine that we do:

===== Ethics 1, Prop. 15:
    If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally prone to divide quantity [Extension]? I answer, that quantity [Extension] is conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity [Extension] as it is represented in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible.

    This will be plain enough to all, who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are distinguished, not really, but modally.
=====

    Notice that, as Spinoza often does throughout his writings, he reminds us here to distinguish between our intellect (or understanding) and imagination. Now, as an exercise in thinking about "motion and rest" and the Attribute of Extension, as these are common to all bodies and they also form the bases of Reason (for Spinoza anyway), it might help to spend some time thinking over the following properties of the Understanding and, with regard to "motion and rest" especially, pay close attention to the second and third properties as listed:

===== TEI-P108(87):
    The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly remarked, and which I clearly understand, are the following:--

1. It involves certainty --in other words, it knows that a thing exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively.

2. That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas absolutely, some ideas from others. Thus it forms the idea of quantity [Extension] absolutely, without reference to any other thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into consideration the idea of quantity [Extension].

3. Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other ideas. Thus in the idea of quantity [Extension], perceived by means of a cause, the quantity [Extension] is determined, as when a body is perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a point. All these are perceptions which do not serve toward understanding quantity [Extension], but only toward determining it. This is proved by the fact that we conceive them as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived unless the quantity [Extension] be perceived also; we can even prolong the motion so as to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do unless we had an idea of infinite quantity [Extension].

4. The understanding forms positive ideas before forming negative ideas.

5. It perceives things not so much under the condition of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and quantity.

6. The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem so to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused ideas the contrary is the case. They are often formed against our will.

7. The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things, which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance, in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved round two centres, or, again, it conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation to a given straight line, or a cone cut in an oblique plane, so that the angle of inclination is greater than the angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an infinity of other ways.

8. The more ideas express perfection of any object, the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who has planned a splendid temple.
======

    I hope that this might help some in thinking about those specific things "common to all" which Spinoza says form the bases of what he names Reason.