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Hi Gxxxxxxx ..., Hxxxxxx gave an excellent recap and brief explanation of some key related points Spinoza expressed in the Ethics. Now we might want to bring those ideas down to our own "experience" and see if there is more to these simple expressions than might at first "meet the eye." I believe it is a common experience for everyone that we seem to have no trouble with the "body" part of the "mind-body" question because we tend to simply imagine, with the aid of our own memory (rather than form a clear idea of body from the adequate idea of the Attribute of Extension and motion-rest), holding some "body" in front of our eyes (or remembering some other body sense modification such as feeling hearing smelling or tasting) or else we "look at" (feel, etc.) some particular body present to us at the moment and say to ourselves or to others; "That's a body, case closed." When it comes to the "mind" part however we can't seem to readily imagine or point toward anything and say; "That's the mind or an idea." We talk all the time about the "ideas" we have in mind of certain things but what we usually mean by this is just a vague image of a body, or events involving bodies, which may or may not currently be present to us. So, we say for instance that we are "thinking" about going for a bike ride tomorrow rather than saying perhaps; "My imagination is in such a state that I am experiencing an image of myself bicycling in association with events linked together such that it appears to me to be taking place 'tomorrow.' " Spinoza defines what he means by both "body" and "idea" near the beginning of Part 2 of the Ethics and then explains soon after that the "mind" is the "idea" of the "body." And, although he is writing for and focused on human beings, he points out that this is true of all bodies, namely that there must be an "idea of" each and every particular "body" (the ideate of that idea) expressed in the "infinite intellect of God" (the immediate mode of the Attribute of Thought), in the same way as those bodies themselves are particular expressions of the Attribute of Extension involving the immediate mode of that Attribute, namely, motion and rest. You write:
------- Gxxxxxx: As I read the words you wrote my mind affirms a truth related to the statement. However, I have no way of knowing what's in your mind and so I can't say whether your mind is affirming the same idea that my mind is. It is possible that you are merely summarizing the words you've read in the Ethics or those which Hxxxxxx or others wrote, but your mind may not have any clear idea or affirm what Spinoza Understood by those words. It's a great problem which is seldom recognized in ordinary life and of course this leads to all sorts of misunderstandings between people. It might help to look carefully at the first three propositions of Part 2 and then work your way along into the rest of Part 2. I tried for a long time to just go through and look for the few things I thought I could "understand" (actually in most cases I simply had a relatively "clear" image form in my mind) and brushed over the rest. The words passed before my eyes in the sequence they were written and my imagination danced away but my mind formed no clear idea even though I could repeat some of the words eventually from memory. And so, you know, I wanted someone to give me a summary of it all so that I could then maybe understand the details. But the details are all necessary even though you may need to go through the entire Ethics many many times before you begin to have a clear idea of what is being expressed rather than just experiencing the rush of images from your own memory keyed off by the words and phrases as you read (this "dance", as I referred to it above, is of course unique to each reader.) The techniques of "Slow Reading" really helped me in this endeavor. [additional reference regarding the difference between words, images, and ideas:]
====== E2: PROP. 49 Corollary, Note:
Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external
bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental
picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will;
they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with
this misconception, do not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation
or negation.
Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves,
think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This
misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge,
and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore
clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in the
image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily
motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought.... As for trying to understand the ideas Spinoza expressed by using other studies such as neuroscience, the problem that occurs concerns the order of ideas and the failure to begin with "the original true idea" as Spinoza mentioned in that quote I included in my last message from TEI-P44(38). Spinoza again states in the Ethics very clearly the problem involved with beginning with, and attempting to found our thinking on, the "objects of our senses." I quoted this recently too but it seems worth repeating here:
====== E2: PROP. 10 Corollary, Note: For all the wonders of the brain which neuroscience is revealing (and I've actually been studying this myself for the last several years) it is still focused on the particulars of the motion and rest of the myriad parts of the brain with the hope, by some people anyway, of being able to eventually point to some particular neuron or network of neurons and to say something such as; "There is 'the idea' or the 'origin of the idea' in 'the mind' of this individual when they are thinking, case closed." The way I think of neuroscience these days is that it's doing a great job of exploring the nature of the Imagination (as Spinoza defines this -see e.g. E2P17C, Note.) However, modeling or even examining in real-time the actual brain activity which occurs as we imagine things (which of course, as long as the body exists, we will always be doing --see E5P21, E5P34, etc.) does not and cannot reveal what an "idea" is, but only what an "image" is. For instance, think about Spinoza's example of the idea he has that "2 and 3 make 5." In recent years there has been a lot of work done, and excitement generated with, fMRI --functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging --where a particular kind of image of the parts of the living brain is not only produced in static relation to other parts but the changes in the activity levels of those various groups of parts can be observed even as live subjects "think about" particular things. So, let's say that a subject is told to think over the idea that "2 and 3 makes 5." I can't do this myself without my imagination at the same time either imagining bringing together two groups of objects (apples, coins, etc.) and making one group of them, or focusing on the image of the symbols "2 + 3 = 5" or some such and I have no doubt that my brain will assume a particular state of activity in particular regions (maybe different regions depending on the objects or symbols imagined) and so anyone might point at that activity in triumph and say; "See, we have found the origin of the idea that '2 and 3 make 5' in this brain, case closed." The problem is that we have still not realized that we are merely focusing on, even when we use such tools as fMRI to examine the representation of the very body which is the basis of those images, the "objects of our senses" which Spinoza referred to (E2P10C Note above) rather than "keep[ing] to the proper order of philosophic thinking" which requires that we began our thinking with...: "The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature." With regard to the intuitive idea that Spinoza said he had of "2 and 3 make 5", and other things that he Understood (by Reason or Intuition as distinguished from those things he Imagined) it may seem that he is saying that the mind is separate from the body when he shows for instance that:
======= E5: PROP. 29:
Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body,
it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to
that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time
(E5P21 and E2P26). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration
(E1D8). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving
things under the form of eternity,
======= Note: However, if we think more carefully about it we will see that he is merely pointing out that the essence of the mind-body is eternal (as is anything the mind Understands) whether the body actually exists or not. Of course he also points out that our Imagination (the seat of all confused ideas), which depends on the actual existence of the body, can make nothing of the idea of Eternity except such things as:
====== E5: PROP. 34 Corollary, Note: I could go on of course but Spinoza has done such a good job of laying things all out that I would rather suggest you try to follow his meaning and then let's discuss specific things that may give you trouble before trying to figure out how "Kabbalah, neuroscience, and so forth" might be understood or even shown to involve confused ideas if that turns out to be the case. I hope that this might help you but I fear that it won't. Of course, the hope and fear involved are states of my own imagination which I need to work toward understanding! Best Regards, Terry |
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