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Since we have shown in the preceding chapter how the
Passions arise from the error of
Opinion, let us now
see here the effects of the two other modes of
Knowing. And first of all, [the effect] of what we
have called True Belief. [N1]
[Note N1]: Belief is a strong proof based on Reasons, whereby I am convinced in my mind that the thing is really, and just such, outside my understanding, as I am convinced in my mind that it is. I say, a strong proof based on Reasons, in order thereby to distinguish it both from Opinion, which is always doubtful and liable to error, and from Knowledge which does not consist in being convinced by Reasons, but in an immediate union with the thing itself. I say, that the thing is really and just such outside my understanding -- really, because reasons cannot deceive me in this, for otherwise they would not be different from opinion. Just such, for it can only tell me what the thing ought to be, and not what it really is, otherwise it would not be different from Knowing. Outside, for it makes us enjoy intellectually not what is in us, but what is outside us. This shows us, indeed, what a thing ought to be, but not what it really is. And this is the reason why it can never unite us with the object of our belief. I say, then, that it only teaches us what the thing ought to be, and not what it is; between these two there is a great difference. For, as we remarked a propos of the example taken from the rule of three, when any one can, by the aid of proportion, find a fourth number that shall be related to the third as the second is to the first, then (having used division and multiplication) he can say that the four numbers must be proportional; and although that is so, he speaks of it none the less as of a thing that is beyond him. But when he comes to see the proportion in the way which we have shown in the fourth [N1] example, then he says with truth that the thing is so, because then it is in him and not beyond him. *Let* this *suffice* as regards the first [effect]. [Note N1]: A: third; B: fourth. The second effect of true belief is that it brings us to a clearer understanding, through which we love God, and thus it makes us intellectually aware of the things which are not in us, but outside us. The third effect is, that it gives us the knowledge of good and evil, and shows us all the passions which should be suppressed. And as we have already said that the passions which come from opinion are liable to great evil, it is worth the pains to see how these also are sifted out by this second kind of knowledge, so that we may see what is good and what is bad in them. To do so conveniently, let us, using the same method as before, look at them closely, so that we may know through it which of them should be chosen and which rejected. But, before proceeding to this, let us first state briefly what is good and evil of man. We have already said before that all things are necessarily what they are, and that in Nature there is no good and no evil. So that whatever we want man to be *[in this respect]* must refer to his kind, which is nothing else than a thing of Reason. And when we have conceived in our mind an Idea of a perfect man, it should make us look (when we examine ourselves) to see whether we have any means of attaining to such perfection. Hence, then, whatever advances us towards perfection, we call good, and, on the contrary, what hinders, or also what does not advance us toward it, bad. I must therefore, I say, conceive a perfect man, if I want to assert anything concerning the good and evil of man, because if I were to consider the good and evil *of some individual man,* say, e.g., of Adam, I should be confusing a real thing (ens reale) with a thing of Reason (ens Rationis), which must be most scrupulously avoided by an upright Philosopher, for reasons which we shall state in the sequel, or on another occasion. Furthermore, since the destiny of Adam, or of any other individual creature, is not known to us except through the result, so *it follows* that what we can say even of the destiny of man must be based on the idea which our understanding forms of a perfect man,[N1] which destiny, since it is a thing of Reason, we may well know; so also, as already remarked, are good and evil, which are only modes of thinking. [Note N1]: For from no individual creature can one derive an Idea that is perfect; for the perfection of this object itself, [that is,] whether it is really perfect or not, cannot be deduced except from a general perfect Idea, or Ens Rationis. To come gradually to the point: We have already pointed out before how the movement, passions, and activities of the soul arise from ideas, and these ideas we have divided into four kinds, namely, [according as they are based on] mere hearsay, experience, belief, clear knowledge. And from what we have now seen of the effects of all these, it is evident that the fourth, namely, clear knowledge, is the most perfect of all. For opinion often leads us into error. True belief is good only because it is the way to true knowledge, and awakens us to things which are really lovable. So that the final end that we seek, and the highest that we know, is true knowledge. But even this true knowledge varies with the objects that come before it: the better the object is with which it happens to unite itself, so much the better also is this knowledge. And, for this reason, he is the most perfect man who is united with God (who is the most perfect being of all), and so enjoys him. Now, in order to find out what is good and bad in the affects or passions, let us, as suggested, take them one by one. And first of all, Surprise. This, since it arises either from ignorance or prejudice, is an imperfection in the man who is subject to this perturbance. I say an imperfection, because, through itself, surprise does not lead to any evil. |
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