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At present we have to inquire why it happens that sometimes,
although we see that a certain thing is good or bad,
we nevertheless do not find in us the power either to do the
good or to abstain from the bad, and sometimes, however,
we do indeed [find this power in us]. This we can easily
understand if we consider the causes that we assigned to
opinions,
which we stated to be the causes of all affects.
These, we then said, [arise] either from hearsay, or from
experience. And since all that we find in ourselves has
greater power over us than that which comes to us from
outside, it certainly follows that Reason can be the cause
of the extinction of opinions [N1] which we have got from hearsay
only (and this is so because reason has not *like these*
come to us from outside), but by no means of those which we
have got from experience. For the power which the thing itself
gives us is always greater than that which we obtain by way of
consequence through a second thing; we noted this difference
when speaking of reasoning and of clear understanding, page
[ST201],
and we did so with the rule of three as an illustration. For
more power comes to us from the understanding of proportion [N2]
itself, than from the understanding of the rule of proportion.
And it is for this reason that we have said so often that one love
may be extinguished by another which is greater, because in
saying this we did not, by any means, intend to refer to desire
which *does not, like love, come from true knowledge,
but* comes from reasoning.
[Note N1]: It is all the same whether we use here the word opinion or passion; and so it is clear why we cannot conquer by means of Reason those that have come to us through experience; for these are nothing else than an enjoyment of, or immediate union with, something that we judge to be good, and Reason, though it teaches us what is better, does not make us enjoy it. Now that which we enjoy in us cannot be conquered by that which we do not enjoy, and is outside us, as that is which Reason suggests. But if these are to be overcome then there must be something that is more powerful; in this way there will be an enjoyment or immediate union with something that is better known and enjoyed than this first; and when this exists victory is always assured; or, indeed, *this victory comes* also through tasting an evil which is recognized to be greater than the good that was enjoyed, and upon which it follows immediately. Still, experience teaches us that this evil does not necessarily always follow thus, for, &c. See pages [ST205], [ST219] [Note N2]: A and B: the rule. |
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