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R.H.M. Elwes included a note to the following in his English translation
(1883) of "On the Improvement of the Understanding":
========= TEI-P33(33):
...A true idea (for we possess a true idea) is something different from its
correlate ('ideatum'); thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle.
The idea of a circle, is not something having a circumference and a centre,
as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. Now, as it is
something different from its correlate, it is capable of being understood
through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence
('essentia formalis') is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective
essence ('essentia objectiva').[Note1]...
Note1:
In modern language, "the idea may become the subject of another
representation." 'Objectivus' generally corresponds to the modern
"subjective," 'formalis' to the modern "objective."--[Tr.]
=========
More detail on this may be found in the following notes in the commentary by A. Wolf to his
English translation (1910) of Spinoza's "Short Treatise On God, Man, and His
Well-Being":
========
16,3 'Formaliter' = actually or objectively (in the modern sense). The
identification of 'formalis' and 'actualis' in medieval philosophy was due
to the influence of Aristotelianism. According to Aristotle, individual
things are compounds of Matter and Form, and Form is the more important of
the two. Matter is the as yet imperfect or merely potential, which requires
Form to make it actual. Hence during the supremacy of Aristotelian
philosophy in the Middle Ages, Matter was identified with Potentiality, and
Form with Actuality, so that 'formalis' = 'actualis'. [This does not mean of
course that Spinoza subscribed to this Aristotelian concept! -TNeff]
16,9 "Objective" = in thought, or 'subjectively' (in the modern sense). The
present use of the terms "subjective" and "objective" is the reverse of
former usage. By "subject" ('subjectum' = [a Greek term]) used to be meant
the substrate or concrete reality supporting or "underlying" its properties,
and hence also the subject of predication, because in predication these
properties or qualities are generally predicated of their "subject." By
"object" ('objectum' = [a Greek term]), on the other hand, was meant
something which consisted in "lying opposite" or before the mind ('quatenus
objicitur intellectui'), so that "objective" referred only to the sphere of
thought. This usage is already met with in the writings of Duns Scotus (died
1308), and continued, with some modifications, right into the eighteenth
century --Berkeley, e.g., still used "real" as an antithesis to "objective."
The noun "object" (objectum) acquired its present meaning long before the
adjective did. Already Descartes used the term "objects" for "things" ("in
objectus, hoc est in rebus." --Principia Phil.). The transition to the
present meaning of "subjective" was probably brought about by the
application of the term 'subjectum' to the soul as distinguished from (or as
the bearer of) its "objective" ideas. (Leibniz, e.g. used the expression:
"subjectum ou l'ame meme." Hence "subjective" came to indicate whatever had
reference to the soul.
========
Also, in the Preface to Samuel Shirley's original published English
translation (1992) of the Ethics, TEI, and Selected Letters [not found in his newer
"Spinoza: Complete Works" publication (2002)] he includes a similar explanation for
'essentia formalis' and 'essentia objectiva'.
Notice also that Elwes translates using the modern terms as in...:
"actual essence" and "subjective essence"
...above while Shirley and Curley in the same and similar places use:
"formal essence" and "objective essence"
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